Snub the Private Number: The Evri Redelivery Scam Has a Dangerous Part 2

The EVRi scam just got a lot worse. Here’s how to protect yourself as a consumer in this shark-filled digital cesspit.

The Rose Machine
12 min readDec 2, 2022
EVRi electronic vehicle — EVRi scam — EVRi redelivery scam
Evening Standard — EVRi scam — edited by Author

Apologies for the slight deviation from my usual content. I was recently scammed and wanted to help raise awareness — the best way I knew how.

This is my experience of the EVRi redelivery scam that has been circulating since the start of 2022. I hope it helps those who might get targeted.

What is the EVRi redelivery scam?

Several people have reported receiving texts saying they need to pay for redelivery from the EVRi delivery service, as part of a “smishing” scam.

The smishing scam involves sending text messages that appear to be from reputable companies in order to trick individuals into divulging personal information.

Those who fall victim to the scam are instructed to enter their bank information on a fake EVRi website (evri-redelivery.com) that claims to charge a redelivery fee of £1.45.

Although the amount of money they are claiming is small, the fake EVRi scam texts aim to install spyware on your phone so scammers can steal your details.

My experience with the EVRi redelivery scam

I received my EVRi scam text message on the 1st of November 2022.

Fortunately for the scammers, I was susceptible to it because my partner and I were getting deliveries left right and centre. We’re settling into a new home.

We get alerts from our doorbell intercom on our phones and it was possible that delivery could have been attempted while we were still asleep with our phones on aeroplane mode.

I should have checked the app but I just assumed when I read the text.

And you know what they say about assuming…

They even told me the name of the driver to make it more humanistic. It plays on our emotions, even making us feel slightly guilty for making poor “Matthew” wait outside.

I did notice the text message was sent twice. This could have been down to a technical glitch, so I just let it go.

EVRi missed delivery text message scam — 1st November 2022 — EVRi scam — EVRi redelivery scam
Screenshot by Author — EVRi scam text message from +44 (756) 353–4921

Florence Trust originally reported that the EVRi redelivery scam has been in circulation since April 13, 2022, and the numbers that people should be on the lookout for are +44 (756) 896–3015 and +44 (739) 419–4403.

As you can see by the number that scammed me, +44 (756) 353–4921, these do tend to change.

What should you do if you receive this EVRi scam text?

Don’t click the link.

That’s how the EVRi scam spyware leeches your mobile phone.

Not only did I click but I made it easier for them by filling out the phoney forms, and entering my full address and card details in hopes my phoney delivery will be rebooked.

I did question why it was charging me £1.45 to do this… but as so many socially compliant people do, I chose to just get this transaction done and return to my day.

I immediately regretted it and called my bank, cancelled my card, ordered a new one and reported the incident to them.

What should you do if you fall prey to the EVRi redelivery scam?

If this EVRi scam has happened to you and you also provided your sensitive information, don’t panic.

Call your bank immediately to cancel your card, order a new one and report the incident.

There doesn’t seem to be much they can do with your address details and email but they may continue to send text messages.

I received this follow-up scam text 5 days later.

The funky formatting would have been a dead giveaway that it was a scam text had I received this one first.

EVRi missed delivery text message scam — 6th November 2022 — EVRi scam — EVRi redelivery scam
Screenshot by Author — EVRi scam text message from +44 (754) 370–2877

If this is the case for you and you use a UK mobile network, you can also forward the text to 7726 for free.

It will prompt you to share the mobile number that sent it and will notify you of your delivery report.

Here’s what it looks like:

Reporting an EVRi scam text to 7726 — EVRi scam — EVRi redelivery scam
Screenshot by Author — reporting an EVRi scam text to 7726

Even though it uses the word “spam” to describe the EVRi redelivery scam, it’s an all-encompassing term. The number ‘7726’ was chosen because it spells ‘SPAM’ on an alphanumeric phone keypad, which also makes it easier to remember.

Ofcom has further information and handy instructions on how to do this on your particular mobile phone.

EVRi has also shared advice for avoiding scams on its website and says that anyone who receives the text should take a screenshot and report it to phishing@evri.com.

Additionally, you can report this EVRi scam to Action Fraud by calling 0300 123 2040 or visiting the Action Fraud website. It’s the reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Reports of fraud and any other financial crime in Scotland should be made to Police Scotland via 101.

The new second part of the EVRi redelivery scam

Scam texts forwarded. Number given. End of discussion.

Or so I thought…

On the evening of the 8th of November 2022, I received a call from a private number from an authoritative-sounding man claiming to be from my bank’s fraud department.

It was close to 5:30 pm and the man on the line informed me there had been an attempt of three direct debits being set up on my account from a location in Aberdeen, Scotland…

…over 500 miles from where I lived.

He went through each direct debit and their amounts.

The first was with Argos.

The second I couldn’t fully remember but sounded like some sort of cable/construction company.

And the third was with Pure Gym.

Needless to say, I was panicked, not only by the thought of a stranger already being able to attempt fraudulent activity on my account but I was questioning every word spoken by this stranger on the line with me.

I told him about the EVRi scam messages I’d received.

He told me he needed to run a risk assessment on my account and provide me with a new sort code and account number to secure it.

But first, he’d need me to confirm the following details:

  • my sort code
  • my account number
  • any unrecognised direct debits
  • whether my account had an overdraft facility
  • whether I also had any savings accounts
  • the current amount of money in each of my accounts.

I wasn’t entirely convinced of this person’s intentions or legitimacy but in the interest of wanting to secure my account and move on from this, I believed them and reluctantly gave out the above details.

I did manage to ask for proof of where he was calling from and told me his name and “badge number”.

In case this particular person is stupid enough to use the same one twice or gives out a similar alphanumeric badge number, here they are:

Nigel Peterson

Badge number: HG419M8

A.k.a my ‘EVRi redelivery scam mascot’.

I later found out from my bank’s actual fraud department they don’t have badges or badge numbers.

And, yes, I did notice the text-speak language of ‘M8’ he could have used just to add insult to injury.

The caller put me on hold for close to 40 minutes while they carried out the alleged “risk assessment” on my bank account. Again, I just went along with it.

I’m still very wary of this very long hold period.

What were they doing during this time?

Were they already trying to use my details to make direct debits?

Were they trying to connect with my phone in some way?

Were they on the line with other victims?

There were certain things I questioned throughout the call, which I have outlined in the ‘Tactics to look out for if you get this call’ section below.

Despite the call lasting close to an hour, the caller told me their system was experiencing poor connection and that he needed to call again tomorrow to complete the process.

This person or his “colleague” was due to call between 10 am and 12 pm today. This time has come and passed and lo and behold, I have received no call.

It’s clearly a line they use to get off the phone and on with their shady dealings.

It was at that point of the call I also noticed I could hear the faint sound of cars passing by… Even if working remotely, a legitimate bank or building society wouldn’t permit representatives to do that, especially if undergoing a so-called “risk assessment”.

Tactics to look out for if you get this scam call

Why would they need certain details from me if they already had my account details in front of them?

That’s what I continued to ask myself as the EVRi redelivery scam call carried on. It’s also what drove me to ask my caller the following questions:

“Why would you need my sort code and account number? Aren’t they on your screen?”

“Surely you can see whether my account has an overdraft facility. Why are you asking me this?”

“Why would you need me to confirm what sorts of accounts I have and the amount of money in each of them?”

“I’ve not heard of banks changing these details over the phone… is this the usual official procedure?”

“Has my current account now been blocked to stop any fraudulent payments?”

“Can you give me a direct number to reach you in case I have any questions or if we get disconnected?”

“Can you provide proof of identification and where you’re calling from?”

They were highly trained in handling these objections. They answered with enough knowledge to satisfy my concerns enough to complete the call.

I was able to notice certain tactics he used that gained my trust and fooled me into believing he was who he claimed to be.

They’re authoritative

I used to work for telesales and telefundraising companies in the past that are trained to handle customer/support objections. From the very top of my call, I could tell this man came from the same background.

He sounded well-versed in his introduction, and ended some sentences with either “ok?” or “Miss Butcher”. Very formal. Very compliant.

He had a certain tone that could only come with being used to reading a script, which translated enough confidence to convince me it was a routine call.

He also perfected a courteous manner that reminded me of other representatives from the bank I’d spoken to in the past. He apologised for making me wait and that I felt worried about the news.

Banks usually go through brief security questions to confirm my identity. This was made with information I had provided in the initial EVRi redelivery scam but I wouldn’t realise that until after the call.

He also cleverly mirrored information that I gave him (i.e. reporting the EVRi scam and ordering a new card) in a way that made me think he was looking at my notes on their system.

Another thing I noticed was once he knew I wouldn’t answer a question, he simply moved on to another. This happened when I asked him why he needed me to tell him whether or not I had an overdraft facility.

He didn’t even address it and swiftly moved on to say “if any payments were to be taken from your account that would dig into my overdraft they would be reversed.”

He successfully gaslighted me.

They’re well researched

Criminals are excellent at using Google to mimic legitimate protocols.

My caller got all his information online and rehearsed it well enough to be able to handle my objections and still convince me to hand over my details.

For instance, he told me there wasn’t a direct number to the fraud department and that I’d need to call customer services and ask to be connected. This is true, as the real fraud department representative told me.

If you’re in the UK you can, however, dial 159 from your mobile or landline and be securely connected to your bank or building society.

Registered companies and charities usually ask for your sort code and account number when setting up or reinstating direct debits over the phone.

The fact that my bank was asking me this seemed fishy but the caller knew the scripted response to reassure me it was all part of the process.

They appear to look out for your best interests

During a brief pause to the very long process of running my supposed risk assessment, my caller let me know that it was 43% complete, took a moment to let me know of similar scams circulating right now (including the EVRi scam) and asked me to give him the mobile numbers that sent me the original EVRi redelivery scam text messages.

It gave me a false sense of security. That this person was indeed adding all of this to a report that will be raised with a higher authority to help stop these scammers.

It was just another part of the scam.

He also told me he needed the amounts in each of my accounts so he’d be able to monitor if any money was removed. He announced the exact times of day I provided them to him as if being documented in an official report.

At the time it seemed like this was a noble act by a dedicated rep. In reality — and hindsight — they just wanted me to tell them how much money they had to play with.

And I foolishly did.

They make you feel pressured

Criminals may panic you into believing your account has been accessed and force you to send personal information.

A few ways my caller did this to me were:

  • speaking very fast and rushing through points
  • acting flippant about handing over my details, to make me think it’s the norm
  • ending his responses with “do you understand, Miss Butcher?”
  • asking me to repeat what he’d just said (including his name and badge number), which made me feel patronised and belittled for even raising the questions I did
  • not giving me an alternative way to secure my account other than the present call, there and then.

Warnings about these sorts of scam calls

I only discovered this after calling my bank the moment after the scam call had ended and speaking with a real fraud department representative.

  1. No legitimate bank representative will ever need you to confirm these details, as they would already have access to them.
  2. Risk assessments that check the likelihood of fraudulent activity on bank accounts don’t exist. Thinking about it now, it seems so foolish to think any sort of software would need to run if my bank had already informed me of fraudulent attempts.
  3. It’s impossible to change your sort code and account number without needing to request that the entire account be closed and a new one be opened with a new sort code and account number.

Ending notes

This was definitely linked to the EVRi redelivery scam. Both incidents were just too conveniently timed.

I wish I’d been hypervigilant enough to quickly find my phone’s recording function and hit ‘start’, but as these things usually go, you don’t know what’s happening to you until it’s too late.

My bank’s real fraud department told me no one had called me today and no notes were left on my system.

When the representative broke the news to me that I’d just been fooled by very convincing scammers, I was distressed, embarrassed and sick to my stomach.

And all it took was opening one EVRi scam link.

It’s so easy to fall prey to their tactics because we want to trust the good in people.

Unfortunately, there are criminals out there who will use our fear and lack of banking knowledge to exploit us.

My bank told me these scammers could even try to call them pretending to be you. I’m lucky I was able to forewarn them before they got the chance.

If you or anyone you know falls victim to the EVRi redelivery scam and gets approached by this person or other scammers like them, please don’t do what I did.

I wouldn’t wish this experience on anyone.

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The Rose Machine

Digital Artist, Graphic Designer, and Etsy Business Owner living with ADHD and a head of overwhelming ideas I can't keep up with - so AI helps me.